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COMMENTS
THE DRUG COURT MODEL AS A
RESPONSE TO "BROKEN WINDOWS"




This Comment examines the current trend toward crimi-
nalization of homeless people and its impact on the mentally ill
among them, and argues that drug treatment courts provide the
best model for striking a balance between the "Giuliani ap-
proach" to the homeless mentally ill and opposing civil rights
arguments. New York City, as governed by former Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani's administration, illustrates the effects of
criminalization as an ill-fitting solution to the city's homeless-
ness crisis. The general academic consensus is that this ap-
proach is merely a band-aid solution to the more complex social
and economic issues that force increasing numbers of Ameri-
cans into the streets.' But despite almost universal condemna-
tion of criminalization, no consensus exists as to the best
alternative means to address homelessness.
The extreme diversity of the homeless community presents
inherent difficulties in addressing its problems. Although there
are commonalities, such as high percentages of mental illness
and drug addiction, this community requires a broad range of
J.D. candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2002.
'Maria Foscarinis, Kelly Cunningham-Bowers & Kristen E. Brown, Out of Sight-
Out of Mind?: The Continuing Trend Toward the Criminalkaion of Homdessness, 6 GEo. J
ONPOVER=L. & POLY 145,159 (1999).
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social services.2 Criminalization as a solution to homelessness
has resulted in high incarceration rates of people who commit
petty crimes associated with homelessness, such as sleeping in a
park or begging in the subway.3 At the same time, criminaliza-
tion and incarceration of the homeless has failed to provide this
diverse community with the comprehensive social services that it
so desperately requires.'
Among those opposed to the Giuliani model are civil rights
advocates who believe that the Constitution protects the rights
to live on the streets and not to be institutionalized or detained.!
These critics contend that short-term solutions, such as tempo-
rary shelters and involuntary confinement, detract funds from
long-term projects addressing the needs of the homeless.6 They
argue that people have a basic, even constitutional, right to re-
main on the streets until social policy evolves to meet their
needs. Additionally, many of these advocates argue that the
visible presence of homeless people in major cities will engen-
der sympathy and foster public sentiment in favor of changing
social policy.
Civil rights-based criticisms are valid in response to forced
detention of people who have not committed crimes or are be-
ing treated abusively in confinement. Humanitarian efforts fa-
cilitated, to a certain extent, the release in the 1950s of patients
from mental institutions into communities, many of whom are
now homeless.9 However, civil rights advocates or civil libertari-
ans impermissibly failed to provide tangible solutions by focus-
ing "far more heavily on obtaining liberty for patients than on
seeking services for them."0 Their advocacy has resulted in
2 Lorne Sossin, The Griminalization and Administration of the Homeless: Notes on Possi-
bilities and Limits of Bureaucratic Engagement, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CiANGE 623, 627
(1996).
3 Foscarinis, supra note 1, at 147.
' T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Men-
tal Disorders: Searchingfor Rational Health Policy, 24 AM.J. CRIM. L. 283, 299 (1997) (de-
scribing the maladjustment to prison by the mentally ill and high suicide rates).
5 Peter A. Barta, Note, Giuliani, Broken Windows, and the Right to Beg, 6 GEO. J. ON
POVERTYL. & POL'Y 165, 165 (1999).
6 Foscarinis, supra note 1, at 147 (see generally).
Barta, supra note 5, at 193.
'Id
Nancy K. Rhoden, The Limits of Liberty: Deinstitutionalization, Homelessness and Liber-
tarian Theory, 31 EMORYL.J. 375, 380 (1982).
'0 Id at 377.
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what essentially amounts to a right to starve on the streets and to
be effectively cut off from any form of treatment or assistance."1
Although certain criticisms of institutionalization of the men-
tally ill as it existed prior to the 1950s were justifiable, antici-
pated relief upon their release into communities was woefully
inadequate. 2
This Comment argues that a middle ground exists between
the extreme positions of criminalization of homelessness and
complete freedom for the mentally ill among the homeless.
Over-zealous protection of civil rights for the mentally ill is un-
justified. However, funneling this group in and out of jails or
prisons is equally deplorable and ineffective. Instead, this
Comment looks to the emerging drug treatment courts as a vi-
able model for involving the criminal justice system at a more
therapeutic and individualized level of administering to the
homeless mentally ill population. The appropriate and realistic
goal is to find a means within an imperfect system for humane
and individualized treatment for the homeless mentally ill.
Part I of this Comment discusses the trend in New York City
to criminalize homelessness under the Giuliani administration,
which supports its policies with a "Broken Wimdows" theory of
crime deterrence. Part II considers the validity of crime deter-
rence and other reasons advanced in support of cities' policies
that criminalize homelessness. Part III examines the complexi-
ties of the homeless community, which is composed in large
part of former mental health patients released into the commu-
nity following deinstitutionalization, and how jails and prisons
have come to replace mental institutions in recent times. Part
IV describes the role of civil libertarians in bringing about dein-
stitutionalization and argues that their efforts have not provided
a better solution than institutionalization. Part V argues that in
the wake of deinstitutionalization and resulting incarceration of
former mental patients, a balance can be struck between jail
and complete freedom, by involving the criminal justice system
in a more therapeutic way. Finally, Parts VI and VII discuss the
emergence of the drug treatment courts and argue that this ap-
parently successful model could be useful in assisting the home-
less mentally ill.
" I& at 381 (describing the release of residents from mental institutions with "a
quartjar of valium and a shopping bag").
12 Id. at 399.
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I. THE GruLIA MODEL OF CRiMrNALJUSTICE IN NEWYORK CITY:
A CASE iN POINT
The election of Rudolph Giuliani as mayor of New York City
in 1993 ushered in a new era in law enforcement policy, and
brought with it a forty percent drop in the city's crime rate.
Many of the mayor's supporters, who have witnessed dramatic
changes in New York City's landscape in the last decade, are
quick to attribute the decrease in large part to the city's adop-
tion of "a zero tolerance approach to seemingly minor crimes
such as littering, panhandling and defacing property.'' 4 They
marvel at how safe, or at least uncluttered, New York's streets
have become as they stroll to the theaters around Times Square.
Others are more skeptical in contemplating the current where-
abouts of the city's transient community.
In adopting this policy, Giuliani cited the "Broken Win-
dows" approach to policing proposed in a 1982 Atlantic Monthly
article by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling. 5 Wilson and
Kelling argue that allowing indications of disorder, such as a
broken window, to remain unaddressed demonstrates a loss of
public order and control in the neighborhood, and thus breeds
more serious criminal activity.16 According to the theory, crime
feeds on disorder, so the deterioration of "subways, schools or
neighborhoods give [s] the impression that anything goes [and]
that nobody cares," encouraging the criminally inclined to be-
lieve that they can get away with committing more serious of-
fenses.'
Perhaps no group has been hit harder by such quality of life
initiatives than the New York homeless population. A key part
of the Broken Windows policy is to keep the homeless out of
sight, generally by sweeping large homeless populations and ar-
rest violators of ordinances which prohibit "begging, sleeping or
'camping,' sitting, lying down, loitering, or obstructing pedes-
trian traffic in public places," or imposing restrictions "on being
in particular public places during certain hours." 8
13Barta, supra note 5, at 194 n.1.
" Id. at 166.
"Id.
16 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANImc MONTHLY,
March 1982, at 29.
7Barta, supra note 5, at 167.
" Focarinis, supra note 1, at 147-48.
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One of the central aims of New York City's policy was to
eliminate panhandling in the subway system. To achieve this
objective, the Metropolitan Transit Authority ("MTA") and the
New York City Transit Authority ("TA") employed a regulation
that prohibited "solicitation for charitable, religious or political
causes" in and around the subway 9 For example, the ban ex-
tended to subway cars, areas not generally open to the public,
areas within twenty-five feet of a token booth, and areas near
subway escalators and elevators.20 In addition, the TA launched
a public relations campaign designed to discourage giving to
beggars on the 
subway.
Detractors of this approach have questioned its legitimacy as
a means to deter crime. They challenge that New York City's
lowered crime rate can be attributed to various alternative fac-
tors, such as a nationally decreasing crime rate (irrespective of
enforcement policy), an improved economy and increased po-
lice force.2 However, "Broken Windows" author George Kelling
has maintained that New York's lowered crime rates should be
attributed to the new governance.23 In a 1998 article, Kelling
described "in your face panhandlers who terrorized passengers
and TA employees," and asserted that "'homelessness' was
frightening passengers and causing them to abandon the sub-
way in droves.
As the debate continues, the City's criminalization policies
have been subject to legal challenge by the homeless commu-
nity and its advocates.2 Two important lawsuits have attacked
the subway policy on constitutional grounds. In Young v. New
York City Transit Authority, the Legal Action Center of the Home-
less brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of two homeless
men alleging that "the prohibition of begging and panhandling
in the subway contravene [d] the rights to free speech, due pro-
cess and equal protection of the law."6 The Second Circuit up-
"Youngv. NewYork City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting
N.Y. Comp. R. & REGS. tit. 21, §§ 1050.6(b)(2), 1050.6(c)(1)-(3)).
20IdL
" Barta, supra note 1, at 172.
Id. at 194 nn.19-23.
George Kelling & William Bratton, Declining Crime Rates: Insiders' VIrews of the New
York City Sto-y, 88J. CmiM. L. & CRnINOLOGY 1217, 1220 (1998).
2 Id at 1221.
Barta, supra note 5, at 165.
' Youngv. NewYork City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146, 148 (2d Cir. 1990).
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held the constitutionality of the statute, finding that "begging is
much more 'conduct than it is speech' and panhandling f[alls]
far outside the scope of protected speech under the First
Amendment."' Three years later, in Loper v. New York City Police
Dep't, an additional class action challenged the constitutionality
of a New York anti-loitering law that made it illegal to loiter,
remain or wander about in a public place for the purpose of
begging.28 This time, the Second Circuit found that the statute
was neither content-neutral nor narrowly tailored, thus "over-
broad," in that it aimed to curtail a certain kind of speech-
begging-and therefore violated the First Amendment.
II. THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS:
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
Despite this Comment's rejection of the means employed by
New York City to sweep the homeless off the streets, it supports
the general aim of removing people from the street. However,
assistance or positive intervention on behalf of the homeless
mentally ill can be accomplished through an alternative use of
the criminal justice system, similar to the experimental drug
treatment courts.30 Although this solution necessarily involves
some civil liberty costs to the extent that coercive treatment is
advocated,31 these costs are not as great as an outright denial of
liberty through incarceration.
In addition to crime-deterrence arguments illustrated by the
New York model and the Broken Windows theory, several other
justifications for cracking down on petty "offenses" and home-
lessness have been proposed.32 City officials have argued that
health and safety concerns on the part of the general public and
homeless peoplejustify criminalizing homelessness.3
However, some opponents of criminalization respond that
unsightliness aside, homeless people do not pose a threat to
health or safety, and such policies "are often counterproductive,
creating artificial barriers for people on the path toward self-
I2d at 153-56.
Loper v. New York City Police Dep't, 802 F.Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Loper v. NewYork City, 999 F.2d 699, 701-706 (2d Cir. 1993).
See discussion infra Part VI.
"See discussion infra Part V.
3Foscarinis, supra note 1, at 151.
"Id. at 152.
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sufficiency and undermining individual efforts to escape pov-
erty."'4 This response is short-sighted because it assumes that
the "choice" to live on the street has been made with some de-
gree of competency. Homeless individuals' mental health con-
ditions render many of them incapable of getting "on the path
toward self-sufficiency" without intervention.?
Nonetheless, advocates of criminalization "cite the need to
preserve the economic vitality of urban business districts and
the promotion of tourism as justifications for anti-homeless
policies."36 Their detractors respond that homelessness is not
the cause, but the effect of economic decline.3 Related aes-
thetic and quality of life concerns are also cited as explanations
for the criminalization of homelessness. Improving the aes-
thetic quality of public places is a worthy goal, but "[t]he adop-
tion of laws and policies that attack the homeless rather than
attacking the social economic issues at the root of homelessness
is an ineffective strategy" that imposes "punishment on people
for something they cannot reasonably avoid. "'s In reality, both
of these reasons explain why leaving the homeless on the streets
is unpleasant and problematic, but neither of these reasons jus-
tifies criminal punishments.
Although criminalization of homelessness is presented as
economically sound, increased fringe costs associated with its
administration undermine the soundness of economic argu-
ments. Irrespective of the success or failure of constitutional
challenges, cities must expend money in defending themselves,
which detracts from funding available for treatment programs.$9
In addition, any cost-benefit analysis of a "Broken Windows" re-
gime must consider the cost of allocating police officers to the
task and maintaining the prisons that will increasingly house the
homeless.4
However, different economic models present conflicting
data, despite general agreement regarding the shortage of
TId.
See Rhoden, supra note 9, at 393 (describing lack of organization following dein-
stitutionalization that prevents former mental patients who are incapable of negotiat-
ing bureaucratic hurdles from obtaining necessary services).
"' Foscarinis, supra note 1, at 154.37 &rd
Id. at 155-56.5 Foscarinis, supra note 1, at 153.
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money assisting the homeless community with its underlying
problems. According to United States Department of Housing
& Urban Development figures, the cost of providing housing,
food, transportation, and counseling to homeless people would
be less expensive on a daily basis than detaining that person in
jail.41 In contrast to the federal figures, Milwaukee County Sher-
iff Lev Brown stated that pubic policy criminalizes mental illness
to save money. 2 He commented that "warehousing the men-
tally ill in jail" costs $60 a day while the cost of treating them at
Milwaukee Mental Health Complex is $527 a day.43
Despite the previously mentioned justifications for criminal-
izing homelessness, the underlying reason is that criminaliza-
tion is the last resort." This is particularly true in the case of the
homeless mentally ill population, many of whom have been re-
leased into communities without adequate funding to accom-
modate them. 5 According to Nancy K. Rhoden, Ohio State law
professor and former consultant to the Coalition for the Home-
less, "[t]he reason deinstitutionalization has failed is simple:
adequate community facilities have not been created."6 The
fact that many members of this community might not be com-
petent to comply with their treatment programs due to mental
illness complicates matters further.
7
The only viable explanation for criminalizing homelessness
among those cited above is out of necessity and lack of commu-
nity resources. More and better treatment options for mental
illness in the community is the optimal solution. But as public
policy apparently opposes this ideal,48 the current choice be-
tween life on the streets or in prison should be modified to pre-
vent the injustices associated with criminalization.
41 Id at 155.
" Meg Kissinger, Broken Promises 25 Years After We Unlocked the Mentally Ill: Trading
One Locked DoorforAnother, MILw.J. SENrTNAL, Sept. 10, 2000, at 4A.
43 id
44 id
' Rhoden, supra note 9, at 376.
46 Id
47 See discussion infra Part V.
" See discussion infra Parts I and IL
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III. THE HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL AS A SPECIAL SUBSET WITH
DIFFERING NEEDS
The actual number of homeless people in America today is
difficult to quantify with precision. Estimates have ranged be-
tween 300,000 to 3,000,000 nationwide."' In New York City, the
ranks of the homeless ballooned by an estimated 350% during
the 1980s.50
However, the term "homeless" encompasses a broad spec-
trum of groups that are not homogeneous and do not require
the same types of assistance to address their needs.5 ' For exam-
ple, forty percent of the homeless are estimated to suffer from
alcoholism, though more homeless men than women tend to
suffer from alcoholism.5 2 In addition, recent studies have indi-
cated that eighty percent of male residents in general popula-
tion shelters in New York City and twenty-nine percent of the
adults in the family shelters had tested positive for drug. Fur-
thermore, approximately one-third of the homeless are veterans
at the national level.5 Most important for purposes of this
Comment, an estimated one-third of the homeless-some stud-
ies indicate more--suffer from untreated or under-treated
mental illness.55 Among homeless women this percentage leaps
to ninety percent 5 6
The large percentage of mentally ill individuals among the
homeless population is due in large part to the deinstitutionali-
zation of the mentally ill beginning in the 1950s.5 7 At that time,
new drugs, such as Thorazine, were developed that allowed
schizophrenics and other institutionalized patients to function
better in the community.5 In 1975, the Supreme Court deci-
49 Sossin, supra note 2, at 634.
0 1d. at 635.
51 Id
5 Id. at 635-36.
Id at 636.
54Raymond B. Martin, Homelessness: A Community and a Bibliography. 4 J. COMzE.P.
HEALTH L. & POLY' 203, 208 (1988) (citing a fifty percent figure as reported by the
National Institutes of Mental Health in a 1985 presentation before the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations).
Sossin, supra note 2, at 635.
Idl
Melanie B. Abbott, Homelessness and Substance Abuse: Is Mandatory Treatment the So-
lution?, 22 FoRDHAhiURB. LJ. 1, 74-76 (1994).
Edmond V. Ludwig, The Mentally Ill Homeless: Evolving Involuntary Commitment Is-
sues, 36 VL. L REV. 1085, 1086-97 (1991).
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sion in O'Conner v. Donaldson 9 compelled state hospitals to re-
lease patients who were not "dangerous" and who could survive
in the care of family and friends. These factors, coupled with a
rising civil liberties movement,' have contributed to a decline in
the population of state mental hospitals from approximately
500,000 in the 1950s to less than 100,000 today, with further re-
ductions planned.2
Although civil libertarian advocacy on behalf of the men-
tally ill community clearly contributed to deinstitutionalization,
some scholars have argued that economic factors are a better
explanation. 3 The deinstitutionalization cause became an ideal
social reform policy and resulted in an odd marriage between
liberals seeking to "free" mental patients and fiscal conservatives
seeking to save millions of dollars spent on funding mental in-
stitutions.r In addition, other federal programs, most promi-
nantly Medicaid and Medicare, aided the deinstitutionalization
movement and forced many poor former mental health patients
into the streets.6 Medicaid, which assists states in providing
health services to the poor, does not cover treatment for mental
illness in a state mental hospital for persons between the ages of
twenty-one and sixty-five, and Medicare, which funds treatment
for the elderly, will pay for only 190 days of care in a psychiatric
hospital over the course of a lifetime (despite the fact that there
is no similar restriction for physical illness).6
Deinstitutionalization turned jails into a modern dumping
ground for the mentally ill.67 As civil commitment criteria be-
came more stringent, the type of criminal observation provi-
sions employed by the Guiliani administration became prevalent
and arrests of the mentally ill for minor offenses soared."' To a
certain extent, arrests for minor "offenses" committed by men-
59 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
"Ludwig, supra note 58, at 1086-97.
" See discussion infra Part IV.
62 Ludwig, supra note 58, at 1086.
6 Rhoden, supra note 9, at 382.
6Id. at 383.
66id at 384.
67 Darrold Treffert, Editorial: It Took Awhile, WIscoNsIN PSYCHIATRISr, Vol. 41 No. 1
at 7 (Winter 2000) (citing San Diego newspaper article describing "the LA. County
Jail [as] the nation's largest treatment facility for the severely mentally ill").
Darold Treffert, The MarArthur Coercion Studies: A Wisconsin Perspective, 82 MARQ.
L. REv. 759, 766 (1999).
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tally ill persons were an admitted effort on the part of law en-
forcement officials to get needy persons into a safe environment
and into treatment.6 Ironically, the criminalization of the men-
tally ill has come at a time when alcoholism and drug abuse
have been decriminalized to a certain extent7 and is apparently
a regression to the pre-institutional era that jailed the mentally
ill (until the mid-1800s), n7 Unfortunately, modem jails have
proven equally inadequate in meeting the needs of this group as
their Nineteenth Century counterparts.72
Illustrative of this phenomenon are the following separate
accounts from two New York City judges:
There is a crisis in our nation's jails. Mentally ill offenders are not
receiving adequate treatment while incarcerated. The cycle of mental
illness, crime and homelessness is thus never ending.
With the ever deepening cuts in funding for the mentally ill, society
is now feeling the effects of the ill-conceived closures of state mental fa-
cilities. Jails have become the dumping ground for the mentally ill; in-
deed, jails are now the only places some of these individuals can get
treatment.
As a judge, I have seen firsthand the difficulty in finding treatment
programs for the mentally ill offender. It is far easier to find treatment
programs for those with substance abuse problems such as drug or al-
cohol addiction than it is to place those with mental illness.7'
Another New York judge described a similar experience:
Our jails have become modem mental institutions-albeit institu-
tions neither designed nor able to provide the required care these thou-
sands that were cut loose during the deinstitutionalization of our state
mental hospitals need .... Urban forces spend millions annually inter-
facing with the homeless. Similarly our urban jail holding tanks contain
many homeless persons charged with misdemeanors including failure to
Id. at 767.
7 1Treffert, supra note 68, at 759.
Kissinger, supra note 42, at 4A.




appear on an infraction, such as spitting on the sidewalk or tossing a
cigarette.
As these experiences demonstrate, judges and courts are
overburdened with the problems associated with criminalizing
mental illness or homelessness and express frustration with the
inadequacy of the criminal justice system to provide effective
placement and/or treatment for this group in the wake of dein-
stitutionalization.
IV. THE CiVIL LIBERTARIAN APPROACH
While advocates for the mentally ill worked to limit forced
confinement of the mentally ill during the period of deinstitu-
tionalization, this sentiment also played a role in recent legal
battles over criminalization policy toward the homeless. 7' De-
spite what appears to be the clear failure of deinstitutionaliza-
tion, the social movement continues to attract dedicated
advocates.76
The Loper and Young cases illustrate current libertarian ef-
forts in this area. Proponents argued that begging should be
considered speech, or at least conduct protected by the First
Amendment, because it conveys a message. According to one
scholar, "[t]his humble plea [begging], articulated in the sim-
plest of gestures, can convey a sense of destitution 'worth a vol-
ume of logic,' [and] the plight of an individual homeless person
can carry with it a powerful statement about our failure as a so-
ciety to take care of its own."77 The same scholar concluded that
"[w]e must fulfill the fundamental promise of the First
Amendment-that all Americans, regardless of their wealth or
social status, will be allowed a voice in the political discourse."
Critics of the civil libertarian movement contend that the
price paid for this "voice in the political discourse" by living and
starving in the streets is unjustifiably high.9 Rael Isaac and Vir-
ginia Armat argue in their article, Madness on the Streets, that the
74 Robert C. Coates, Legal Rights of Homeless Americans, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 297, 343-44
(1990).
75 Barta, supra note 5, at 165.
76 See generally id
7Id. at 181 (citing Wayne Barrett & Eileen Markey, 50 Reasons to Loathe Your Mayor,
V=LAGE VOICE, Nov. 4, 1997 (available inWL 11417426)).
78 Id at 194.
" Sossin, supra note 2, at 654.
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rise of what they term a "mental health bar" and its support of
the right of mentally ill homeless people to refuse confinement
and treatment have significantly contributed to the homeless-
ness crisis. 0 Lome Sossin of the University of Toronto summa-
rizes their argument as follows:
[H]omeless individuals cannot be hospitalized against their will unless
they are shown to be a danger to themselves or others. Motivated by a
basic distrust of psychiatry and a belief that the central threat to the
homeless was the possibility of involuntary state confinement, the men-
tal health bar argued for the civil rights of the homeless to be placed
ahead of other concerns, such as these individuals' families interests in
seeing them hospitalized .... [Flamilies of the homeless mentally ill
discovered their loved ones had the "right to refuse treatment," even if
it amounted to little more than a "right to freeze. " 81
Unfortunately, the modem reality has proven that once the
"threat" of involuntary commitment dissipated, it was replaced
by a potentially worse encroachment upon the "right to freeze,"
that of incarceration.
In addition, a rights-based approach emphasizes an individ-
ual's right to refuse treatment regardless of the resulting effect
on her health.a Some scholars have criticized this approach for
"encouraging mentally disabled adults to 'die with their rights
on.')"8  According to Professor Rhoden, lawyers have over-
emphasized liberty and ignored the needs of severely ill patients
unable to recognize their need for treatment in doing so:
[c]ivil libertarians have argued that 'the right to eat garbage or to be a
shopping bag lady is still a very important right' and they are correct, if
this sort of lifestyle is chosen with some degree of competency. But the
notion of a competent choice is complex, and not all of the homeless
mentally disturbed have completely chosen to forego treatment. 8
8 Id.
Sharon Flower, Resolving Voluntary Mental Health Treatment Disputes in the Commu-





V. FINDING A PROPER BALANCE
The past century in America has seen the rise and fall of in-
stitutionalization of the mentally ill and corresponding social re-
form movements.9 Irrespective of the positive intentions of
reformers in this area, one set of bars has effectively replaced
another in modem practice." The preceding era was character-
ized by strict parens patriae state intervention on behalf of the
mentally ill, which relied on a "best interest approach" that
placed primary emphasis on the patient's medical treatment
needs.87 In contrast with the preceding era, deinstiutionaliza-
tion caused the pendulum to swing in favor of the civil rights
approach and its current strict requirements for involuntary
commitment.8
Ironically, the transition toward a civil rights approach cuts
against recent advancements in psychiatric treatment.
[A]t a time when definitive treatment for major mental illness did not
exist-from the 1850s to the 1950s-the authority to intervene was then
too broad, the standards too liberal, and statutes constitutionally too
vague. Yet beginning in the 1950s, after prompt, safe, and effective
treatments became available for many forms of major mental illness,
mental health statutes too stringent and too cumbersome prevented, or
unsuccessfully delayed, such treatment.89
The result is that "the right to refuse treatment cancels out
the right to receive treatment in many instances."9 This tension
between an individual's need for medical treatment and her
constitutional right to refuse such treatment leaves many com-
munity mental health treatment providers with few options
when patients refuse to comply with treatment.9'
A combination of factors, including the failure of deinstitu-
tionalization, compliance problems specific to mental illness,
and advances in treatment programs make it less problematic
from a civil libertarian standpoint to intervene on behalf of
someone who is not competent to evaluate her need for treat-
-'5 Treffert, supra note 68, at 768-69.
Kissinger, supra note 42, at 4A.
,Flower, supra note 82, at 889.
Treffert, supra note 68, at 768.
JId. at 769.
9' Id.
" Flower, supra note 82, at 888.
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ment Accordingly, "[w]hile voluntary treatment has been
shown to have positive therapeutic effects for [patients], it can
create significant compliance issues including, frequently, the
mentally disabled individual's refusal to comply with program
medication and treatment plans." While adherence to treat-
ment is a critical factor, cognitive impairments and delusions
might cause a patient to discontinue or refuse treatment, put-
ting her at risk for injury as a result of psychotic behavior. 3
This refusal to comply does not necessarily indicate that the
patient would refuse the treatment if lucid. A former president
of the State Medical Society of Wisconsin, Darold Treffert, ex-
plains that "[w]hen not in a psychotic state, affected individuals
may clearly and accurately perceive that a rapid treatment re-
sponse to relapse is heavily in their best interests."9 Treffert fa-
vorably cited a recent study indicating that "[m]ore than 50
percent of the re-interviewed patients who said initially that they
did not need to be hospitalized [for mental health reasons] re-
ported that, in retrospect, the decision for their hospitalization
was the correct one."9
In striving to achieve a proper balance between a strict
rights-based approach and highly restrictive solutions of incar-
ceration or institutionalization, the justice system should follow
a more middling type of intervention. A system that prioritizes
clinical interests must necessarily involve sacrificing some liberty
interests based on incompetency of the mentally ill to act in
their own best interest in some cases. Because a patient's illness
sometimes inhibits her willingness to comply with medication
programs, the line between voluntary and involuntary care, or
"coercion," is far from clear.95 According to Treffert's coercion
studies, "major mental illness, by its intrinsic nature and mani-
festations, makes the use of coerced care-rather than pure
voluntary treatment-necessary in some instances."97 Commit-
ment research indicates that coercion can occur with voluntary
admission status as well, and on occasion the involuntarily
' William Spaulding et al., Applications of Therapeulic Jurisprudence in Rehabilitation
for People with Severe and Disabling Mental Illness, 17 T.M. CooM.' L RE%. 135, 156
(2000).





committed patient may have experienced little or no coercion
in spite of the "involuntary" status. 8 Complicating matters fur-
ther, "[ijnvoluntarily committed patients do not invariably deny
their illness and protest the hospitalization process. '' 9
In the modem context, as demonstrated by the Giuliani
administration's approach, the "right to freeze" has been re-
moved once again by criminalization of homelessness. But in-
stead of placing the homeless mentally ill back into psychiatric
institutions, they have been placed into jails and prisons, and
have arguably paid a high price for this new "freedom." Leaving
the state to its own devices seems troubling and paternalistic,
but championing the civil rights of the homeless has proven lim-
ited, if not futile.&°° A proper balance between these inapposite
and ill-fitting extremes can be struck to achieve better admini-
stration of the homeless mentally ill.
VI. THE EMERGENCE OF DRUG TREATMENT COURTS
The government's recent "war on drugs" has resulted in
vigorous pursuit of drug users and traffickers by the criminal
justice system. 1 According to Department of Justice figures,
"[m]ore than half of all prison inmates are illegal drug users,
and each year brings additional legislation mandating long
minimum sentences and other forms of harsh punishment for
those who violate the drug laws." 0 2 Partly motivated by concern
about the increase in drug offenses (largely related to the crack
cocaine epidemic of the 1980s)'0 5 in conjunction with the aban-
donment of a rehabilitative criminal justice system in favor of
deterrence and retribution," "drug treatment courts" have
emerged as an alternative to incarceration for drug offenders.
As of July 1, 1999, there were almost four-hundred drug courts
Id. at 771 (citing an example of a patient who was grateful to have received "co-
erced care" after going into a catatonic state after going off of his medication).
Id. at 778 (citing studies indicating that thirty-four percent of involuntarily
committed individuals believed that they were mentally ill and almost half agreed that
there was no reasonable alternative to hospitalization).
"o See discussion infra Part IV.
,' Michael C. Doff & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experi-
mentalist Government, 53 VAND. L. REv. 831, 831 (2000) (citing Office of Justice Pro-
grams, Annual Report 19 (Fiscal Year 1998), at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/98anrpt/
chap3.htm).
,0 Id. at 841.
, Id. at 839 n.19.
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for adult drug offenders in the United States and more than
half of that number in the planning stages.'
The basic process of the drug court allows a criminal defen-
dant to opt out of a criminal trial for low level, drug-related of-
fenses, with the consent of the prosecuting attorney. The
premise of the drug court system rests upon the notion that
nonviolent drug offenses are victimless crimes and those who
commit them lack the necessary self-control to avoid violating
the law, therefore, drug offenders lack culpability and do not
deserve to be incarcerated. 5 The Brooklyn Treatment Court,
for example, requires that three criteria be met before a defen-
dant is eligible to have her case heard: "(1) [the matter] must
originate within the court's geographical jurisdiction; (2) the
client 'cannot have any violent felony conviction or violent
charge'; and (3) the treatment court clinical staff must deter-
mine that the client is in fact a substance abuser.",
0 7
Moreover, "drug courts treat addicts as clients, rather than
criminals, and provide them with the incentive to rehabilitate
themselves."108 Through the cooperation of the judge and the
prosecuting and defense attorneys, the defendant pleads guilty,
or otherwise accepts responsibility for the offense charged. °
These actors work together "to learn continuously and incre-
mentally from each other rather than instructing them to insti-
tute a comprehensive remedial plan devised by the court alone
or even in consultation with the parties.""0 As "punishment,"
the defendant accepts placement in a court-mandated program
of drug treatment, which could include residential or outpatient
treatment."'
The actual method of treatment allows the judge to monitor
the defendant's progress closely and to evaluate which programs
are successful."' Thus, the court will cease directing defendants
to programs that appear to be ineffective, and will increase re-
Id. at 846.
'0 Lynne M. Brennan, Note, A New Beginningfor Non-Violent Drug Afficted Offenders-
AnEndto Cruel and Unusual Punishmen 22 HAhLLNE L REV. 355, 393 (1998).
'07 Dorf, supra note 101, at 847 n.39.
IG3 Brennan, supra note 106, at 393.
" Dorf, supra note 101, at 832.
"0 Id. at 837.
III a
112 Id. at 832.
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ferrals to more effective programs."' The court's level of in-
volvement with the treatment process facilitates an exchange of
information and a pooling of experience."4 Built into the
treatment process is the awareness, based on new research, that
the client's addiction will likely cause her to relapse during re-
covery. The high probability of relapse "suggested the need for
a counter-intuitive combination of sanctions and forbearance in
treatment. Sanctions were necessary to demonstrate palpably
that relapse was costly, but forbearance was necessary to help
the addict learn through experience to anticipate conditions
that triggered relapse."
Cessation of drug use is the ultimate goal of the drug court
system, and the individual participant progresses toward that
goal incrementally through steps such as showing up for re-
quired court appearances, regularly arriving at treatment ses-
sions on time, attending and participating in treatment,
cooperating with treatment staff, and submitting to regular drug
testing."6 Each client's program is individually tailored to the
level of need involved in a particular case." Benchmarks for
meeting various goals of that program include ceremonies and
tokens of progress, such as advancement to the next treatment
phase, and reduced supervision to reward progress."8 Demo-
tion to earlier program phases, and even confinement if neces-
sary, are employed to sanction non-compliance." 9 Finally, the
court will typically expunge the conviction upon successful
120completion of the treatment program.
The recent implementation of the drug courts has generally
been met with enthusiastic, if cautious, support. Stephen
Balenko of the National Center on Addiction and Substance
Abuse at Columbia University conducted a 1998 study to update
a 1997 General Accounting Office report on the drug courts.'
2'
He found that drug courts generate savings, at least in the short
113 Id.
Id iii.
"' Id. at 841-42.
"1 Id. at 845-46.
7 d.
118 Id-
"9 Id. at 846.
'2 Id. at 832.
12! Id. at 849 n.47 (citing Steven Belenko, Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 1
NAT'LDRUG Cr. INsT. REv. 1, 1 (1998)).
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term, from reduced jail and prison use, reduced criminality and
lower criminal justice costs, and drug courts reduce recidivism
(though this was based on more limited data) for participants
after they leave the program.'2 Related studies have demon-
strated that in addition to lower re-offending rates and reduced
criminal justice costs, the length of time between re-arrest
proved significantly longer than for other non-felony defen-
dants.1 Limited as this and other assessments might be, the
experiment of the drug courts appears to be a promising alter-
native to serving time in prison for these same offenses.
VII. APPLICABILITY OF THE DRUG COURT MODEL TO THE
HOMELESS MENTALLY ILL
A system similar to the drug courts could assist the homeless
mentally ill in addressing their unique needs. The recovery
process, or stabilization of mental illness, and drug addiction
are not entirely dissimilar and involve many of the same relapse
and compliance problems. In addition, both are essentially
health problems that the criminal justice system has been forced
to deal with out of necessity. Occasional coercion, as argued,
seems to have positive implications in the treatment of both
groups.
In addition, substance abuse and mental health treatment
require similar types of "rehabilitation." Similar to substance
abusers, the mentally ill must "reacquire basic personal and so-
cial skills, and the special skills required to manage their ill-
ness" 124 to become functional in society. According to Professor
Elizabeth Wmans of the University of Illinois at Chicago College
of Pharmacy, goals of stabilization for schizophrenia, for exam-
ple, include "minimizing stress experienced by the patient, pre-
venting relapse, facilitating adaptation to life and the
'2'I. at 850.
" Brennan, supra note 106, at 381 (citing Peter Finn & Andrea Newlyn, Miami
Drug Court Gives Drug Defendants a Second Chan ce, 77 J uiDiCAJ-uRE 268 (1994), for sta-
tistics showing that participation in a drug court program totaled about $800 per cli-
ent per year, which represents the cost of incarcerating an offender for roughly nine
days, and that recidivism rates for other non-felony defendant is sixty percent as com-
pared to eleven percent for drug court participants).
,21 Spaulding et al., supra note 93, at 143.
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community, continuing to alleviate symptoms and consolidating
remission."125
Whereas the drug courts plan for relapse as part of the re-
covery process, a primary objective of mental health treatment
of psychotic disorders is to prevent psychotic episodes, and to
minimize their impact when they cannot be prevented. 126 Be-
cause many mentally ill individuals show highly recognizable
patterns of behavior at the beginning of a relapse,27 the right
treatment plan could monitor for this and implement preven-
tive measures if necessary. Similarly, recovering substance abus-
ers must learn to anticipate the conditions that trigger relapse.'
28
In addition, " [e] arly identification leads to early treatment that
can help patients and family gain a feeling of mastery over the
illness." 2 However, because these relapses in the mental illness
model often coincide with refusal to take medication, coercive
treatment should not be ruled out under a scheme similar to
the drug courts.
As further evidence of correlation in treating these prob-
lems, mental illness and drug addiction reportedly share a
commonality in that "a substantial body of evidence indicates
that legally mandated and coerced [drug court] clients gener-
ally perform as well as or better than others in terms of treat-
ment retention, abstinence, and psychological functioning
across a diverse range of settings.",30 Despite the controversial
nature of and ethics involved in coerced treatment of both the
mentally ill and drug abusers, the drug addiction treatment
community strongly endorses the use of coercion.' 3' For exam-
ple, a treatment provider from an addiction center indicated
that "people don't just wake up one morning and decide today
is the day I'll quit my habit. It takes a crisis, like losing a job or
'2 Elizabeth Winans, Effective Management of Schizophrenia, CNS NEWS SPECIAL
EDITION, Vol. 2, December 2000, at 96.
16 Spaulding et al., supra note 93, at 141.
'2 Id. at 158.
121 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
'2 Winans, supra note 125, at 95.
..0 Dorf, supra note 101, at 842 n.23 (citing, in reference to drug treatment, Doug-
las B. Marlowe & Kimberly C. Kirby, Effective Use of Sanctions in Drug Courts: Lessons from
Behavioral Research, 2 NAT'L DRUG Cr. INST. REV. 1 (1999); Charles W. Lidz, Coercion in
Psychiatric Care: Wat Have We Learned from Research , 26J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L.
631 (1996)).
,3' Id. at 842.
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going to jail."13 2 Similarly, another treatment provider found
that "[w]hether participants sought treatment on their own or
were coerced to do so, they reported that entering the program
involved experiencing a crisis." _ Thus, despite the folk wisdom
that a desire to recover is central to recovery, "there is an
emerging consensus that mandated clients perform better than
voluntary ones." "
Data from the previously cited coercion studies seems to in-
dicate that the drug court model could be appropriate for work-
ing with the mentally ill. For example, the coercion studies
demonstrated that:
[T] here is usually a low level of perceived coercion if persuasion and in-
ducement are used rather than threats or force; others, including
friends and family, are involved in the decision making as a form of car-
ing; the patient believes others acted out of genuine concern; the pa-
tient believes he or she was treated respectfully and in good faith; and
the patient was afforded a chance to tell his or her side of the story.135
Similarly, some scholars have proposed mediation as an al-
ternative to a rights-based approach to resolving voluntary
treatment disputes.' The proposed mediation is similar to the
drug court approach in that mediation allows greater flexibility
than more traditional legal approaches: "[Flexibility] is particu-
larly desirable in the resolution of mental health disputes,
where individuals may not be able to abide by more rigid, court-
ordered requirements. Through mediation, the parties may ar-
rive at an agreement that is tailor-made to accommodate the
needs of the [patient] while taking into account the resources
of the community provider. "1 7 This is exactly what the drug
courts have done by providing a middle ground between rigid
court-ordered formalities and involuntary treatment. Further,
"recent studies have shown that mentally disabled adults can
participate in their own treatment decisions and welcome the





' Treffert, supra note 68, at 779.
' Flower, supm note 82, at 893.
137 Id.
'm Id. at 896.
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Thus, the success of coercion in therapy is a unifying theme
in treating both drug addicts and the mentally ill. The drug ad-
dict who does not want to stop taking drugs and is unlikely to
stop absent a crisis can be compared to a mentally ill person
who desires to stop taking her medication, despite her aware-
ness of the potential risks or benefits involved. This type of
mental patient might be in denial of the illness or in a period of
stability that induces this misjudgment, or concerned with the
stigmas associated with mental illness, or reacting to unpleasant
side effects and strict regimens associated with medications.'"
The establishment of a system similar to the drug court to
assist homeless mentally ill clients is a natural progression be-
cause "a significant proportion of people with severe and dis-
abling mental illness interact with the legal/judicial system
because of problems related to their illness"40 as it is. To at-
tempt to alleviate the ethical dilemma of involuntary commit-
ment, a homeless person might opt for the legally prescribed
incarceration for whatever offense triggered involvement with
the criminal justice system, as opposed to mandated treatment.
However, after several such convictions and upon proven clini-
cal need, or upon voluntarily requesting treatment, the individ-
ual could be referred to a mental health treatment court
designed to place respondents into an approved treatment pro-
gram that would potentially include involuntary treatment or
commitment based upon need. Requiring multiple infractions
before resorting to this step would alleviate some civil libertar-
ian concerns, particularly because past negative behaviors result-




It is not difficult to envision other ways in which drug court
models could be established for the homeless mentally ill. They
might offer some type of "conditional release" similar to that
employed by the drug courts to accommodate a particular indi-
vidual's needs when institutionalization is not necessary. If this
type of defendant could not comply with the treatment re-
quirements, he would be faced with a choice of institutionaliza-
tion or incarceration associated with the original infraction.
Thus the offender would be able to choose between taking re-
,s9 Winans, supra note 125, at 95.
40 Spaulding et al., supra note 93, at 136.
' Id. at 161.
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sponsibility for managing his illness or revolving through the
door between life in the streets and injail.
States have previously demonstrated a willingness to resort
to coercion as a means of removing the homeless mentally ill
from the streets and into facilities geared toward treatment and
surveillance.14 ' For example, former Mayor Ed Koch of New
York established Project HELP, which sought to involuntarily
commit mentally ill homeless people to psychiatric institu-
tions.' HELP involved surveillance of homeless people on the
street by social workers and psychiatrists who sought to identify
individuals in need of psychiatric treatment.1 " However, the
program was limited by involuntary commitment laws prevent-
ing forced hospitalization where a particular person did not
pose a danger to herself or others.'5
Maryland more recently has attempted to implement after-
care in the community for mentally ill former inmates, a plan
which could be greatly improved by changing its structure to a
program more similar to the drug courts. Maryland's Commu-
nity Criminal Justice Treatment Program "brings treatment and
criminal justice providers together to screen mentally. ill indi-
viduals while they are confined in local jails, prepare treatment
and aftercare plans for them, and provide community follow-up
after their release."'46
Wisconsin has come closest to implementing a system simi-
lar to the drug courts in its administration of the mentally ill,
but its new policy is limited to involuntary commitment.
7 Wis-
consin has adopted a less restrictive standard for involuntary
commitment known as "the 5th Standard" for civil commitment,
which has been met with some success.4 4 The 5th Standard
provides for earlier intervention in some instances on behalf of
' Sossin, supra note 2, at 654-55.
1 Id. The author documents the story of a woman named Billy Boggs who had
lived a relatively stable life before being diagnosed as schizophrenic. Involuntarily
committed as part of project HELP, she successfully sued to win her release through
the NewYork Civil Liberties Union, but eventually% went on to bounce back and forth
between the street, shelters and psychiatric hospitals. Id.
144 id.
' Id. at 656.
1' Dorf, supra note 101, at 844 n.25 (citing Catherine Conly, Coordinating Commu-
nity Services for Mentally Ill Offenders: Mailand s Community Criminal Justice Treatment




persons with a documented history of mental illness before de-
terioration to physical dangerousness as required by the previ-
ous standard." The 5th Standard includes provisions designed
to account for the likelihood that the person can be treated in
the community, and for whether he or she is likely to avail her-
self of these services.150 In addition, the 5th Standard attempts
to assess the patient's cognitive level regarding the advantages
or disadvantages of a particular medication or treatment.'
Thus, "[m] edication or treatment may be administered without
the consent of the person if, at or after the probable cause hear-
ing, the court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that the
person meets the standard."' 52 At some point prior to or at the
final hearing, "the county must provide a recommended treat-
ment plan" for goals, type of treatment, and expected providers
of inpatient or community after-care upon release.5 An ideal
drug court model would be almost identical to Wisconsin's sys-
tem, but would allow for a "sentence" of community treatment if
the patient did not require involuntary commitment.
Civil libertarians have criticized drug treatment courts, and
would likely direct similar complaints toward treatment courts
for the homeless mentally ill.5 4 Civil libertarians are concerned
that the drug courts are actually worse than the standard crimi-
nal sanctions because drug courts "create incentives for exten-
sion of the criminal justice system and entrenching
criminalizaion."'55 Accordingly, paternalistic officials are able
to extend their reach, and allow family members to selfishly rid
themselves of the burden associated with drug abuse. 55  How-
ever, these critics confuse criminalization with coercion, arguing
that treatment inside the criminal justice system will be coercive,
whereas treatment outside the criminal justice system will be
non-coercive.5 7
Wisconsin's experience with the 5th Standard has not pro-




5' Id. at 781.
153 Id.
' Dorf, supra note 101, at 868-69.
... Id. at 869.
"r Id at 871.
117 Id at 870.
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hospitals, the shifting of funds away from community-based
programs, and constitutional challenges.Y8 Instead, the result
has largely involved "a small number of persons with a docu-
mented history of major mental illness who were deteriorat-
ing... , largely because they went off medication which had
been effective to that point and who were so ill as to be incapa-
ble of understanding the need for or advantages or disadvan-
tages of treatment."' Because of the intervention through the
involuntary commitment process, patients were prevented from
having to suffer further severe mental, emotional, or physical
harm before treatment intervention could occur."4
Civil libertarian concerns regarding the potential for abuse
of discretion in allowing state and or judicial intervention in the
interest of the mentally ill are valid to the extent that they raise
awareness about injustices affecting largely disenfranchised
groups. However, their energies are often misdirected toward
attacking the existing systems instead of fighting for treatment
as effective as that which the courts provide outside of the
criminal justice system.16 ' That some addicts "may prefer to
submit to the supervision of drug courts rather than seek justice
is an indictment of the choices that current social policy af-
fords." 62 Thus, civil libertarians should respond to the limited
availability of treatment outside of the criminal justice system by
striving to increase its availability rather than shutting down the
drug courts.63 The same is true with regard to the homeless
mentally ill. Instead of attacking current policy, advocates for
the homeless mentally ill should focus on better treatment solu-
tions in the community.
CONCLUSION
Criminalizing homelessness, or more specifically, the home-
less mentally ill, is a cruel, ill-fitting solution designed to hide
the underlying lack of resources available to provide services to
this community. Nonetheless, the goal of "sweeping people off
the streets" is not without merit, particularly if there is a system
'6 Treffert, supra note 68, at 782.
160 &d





in place to address their needs. Although coerced treatment of
the mentally ill presents ethical dilemmas, a carefully structured
treatment court program would greatly benefit the homeless
mentally ill despite potential infringements on civil liberties.
Some intervention is necessary, even if coerced, on behalf of the
homeless mentally ill because deinstitutionalization has left
many mentally ill individuals in the street without adequate
community resources, or worse, in jail or prison. This situation
is no better, and perhaps worse, than the mental institutionali-
zation of previous eras.
The drug court model and the ideals associated with Wis-
consin's more flexible commitment standards provide hope that
the current system can be reshaped to provide better treatment
solutions for the homeless mentally ill. Lack of funding pres-
ents the most significant challenge to its implementation. Even
if the drug court model were to be molded to meet the needs of
the homeless mentally ill community, community-based pro-
grams to which courts could refer "clients" would require in-
creased funding to provide the necessary services. In the era of
deinstitutionalization, one of the central problems was that
"[d]ollars that supported hospital beds did not follow the pa-
tient into the community in adequate amounts when those hos-
pital beds closed. While it is often better to treat the seriously
mentally ill in the community where feasible, it is not, if prop-
erly done, cheaper to do so.""
Although the drug court solution might be met with the
same funding obstacles that placing homeless mentally ill clients
who might not require commitment are, there is hope that the
current high cost associated with treatment of the mentally ill
will diminish with the tremendous advancements in available
treatments. 165
With the increasingly effective, well-tolerated, and safe treatments
now available for major mental illness such as severe depression, manic
depressive disorder, and schizophrenia-along with increasing commu-
nity resources and support systems which make such treatments even
more accessible-the number of patients requiring involuntary treatment
is being reduced even further.'rz
Treffert, supra note 68, at 7.
"3 Winans, supra note 125, at 95.
" Treffert, supra note 68, at 763.
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Dramatic advances in the last few decades in understanding and
treating mental illness, including safer, more effective medica-
tions and new psychological therapies, lower the need for ex-
pensive involuntary commitment.
Recent advances in pharmacological treatments indicate
that noncompliance could be reduced.'6 According to a recent
study among patients treated with anti-psychotic medication,
the most commonly cited reason for noncompliance was the oc-
currence of unpleasant side-effects (thirty-seven percent) .'
Similarly, patients highlighted "denial of illness" as a common
reason for noncompliance, though "this reason was linked with
intolerance and intense fear of the side effects of antipsychot-
ics." 170 These fears were not unfounded, as treatment-emergent
extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS), including muscle spasms, in-
voluntary grimacing or chewing movements and symptoms re-
sembling Parkinson's disease (e.g. tremor and rigidity), were
commonly associated with the old anti-psychotics. 7 ' Tardive
dyskinesia, characterized by "chewing and sucking movements,
grimacing, and jerky, purposeless movements of the limbs," is
among the worst of these and can occur in as high as fifteen
percent of patients on the traditional long-term anti-psychotic
drug treatment'7 These disorders often result in social rejec-
tion, hindrance to rehabilitation and poor employment pros-
pects, in addition to causing significant noncompliance and
undermining the therapeutic allegiance betveen patient and
psychiatrist.1
In the 1990s, a new class of anti-psychotics, "atypicals," be-
came available which have been described as "revolutionary."' 74
Their unifying characteristic is a "reduced propensity to induce
motor system disturbance" (or EPS and tardive dyskenesia), and
because of their high patient acceptability these agents (such as
olanzapine and risperdone) should improve compliance with
'6 Spaulding et al., supra note 93, at 135, 141.
' Academic Highlights from Clear Vision-A Fresh Look at EPS (conference held Sep-
tember 23, 1999, at the 12th European College of Neuropsychopharmacology in
London, England),J. GuN. PSYcmUATRY 61:12, December 2000, at 955.
9 & at 955.
'7' 1d. at 995.
'*a Id.
172 Stone, supra note 4, at 305.
173 
d
'7' SeeAcadmic Highlight, supra note 168, at 956.
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treatment and lower the risk of relapse. 75 In considering fund-
ing obstacles, "[a]lthough atypical antipsychotics generally cost
more than traditional agents, recent studies indicate a favorable
pharmacoeconomic impact of atypical agents because of de-
creased rehospitalization rates and reduced total healthcare
burden.'76 This data bodes well, and ongoing studies are cur-
rently examining "the effects of atypical agents on the down-
ward economic spiral suffered by schizophrenics and the long-
term impact of atypical agents on patients' quality of life and
the economic burden of the illness.""
Making uses of new treatments and applying a model simi-
lar to the drug treatment courts could achieve the goal of get-
ting people off the streets and on the path to self-sufficiency.
Hopefully, the pendulum is swinging back from civil rights ad-
vocacy that has left the homeless mentally ill community in the
streets, or alternatively, incarcerated, and moving toward a mid-
dle ground. Society and treatment have progressed from the
days when all social undesirables were locked up indefinitely in
mental institutions. Much has changed since the era of Ken Ke-
say's Nurse Ratched'--we've had the Prozac Revolution, and
drug treatment for the most severe disorders is showing tre-
mendous progress and reduced side-effects. Unfortunately, the
homeless mentally ill community has not felt many of these
changes.
175 Id
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